Abstract
Several problems beset holding creativity as an intellectual virtue. First, the generation of creative ideas does not seem to be in our control. Second, intellectual virtues are based in stable habits, or established dispositions, but creativity seems to require breaking up old habits of thought. Third, for some, intellectual virtues depend on a commitment to truth, whereas creativity is often motivated out of appreciation of beauty or enjoyment. Christopher Hookway's account of intellectual virtue helps us to address these problems because it explains how our epistemic evaluations, i.e., doubting, raising questions, and trusting our beliefs, depend upon unconscious habits, rather than philosophical reflection. We argue that creativity fits well into this account of intellectual virtue since it, too, is an unconscious and even habitual process of epistemic evaluations. Shutting off our theoretical reflection, and relying on our habitual, often affective, responses is central to creative thinking just as Hookway argues it is to inquiry, in general.