Abstract
Since 2001, the United States Army has been involved in several armed conflicts around the world. These conflicts have involved insurgents and emphasized the tactics of counterinsurgency (COIN). The strategic and tactical goals of COIN operations are for governments to bring about stability and effective governance to the local populace of nations. These goals have not materialized the way US commanders have hoped. Thus, in future COIN operations it will be imperative for military leaders to understand how to succeed against insurgencies. This dissertation examines the effectiveness of COIN when small teams of Army personnel are embedded within local indigenous forces. This work challenges the conventional mindset of Army leaders that a heavy troop presence with firepower can win all conflicts. To test this argument, thus the purpose of this study was to compare and contrast COIN operations over the past 70 years in order to identify successful strategies that enabled governments to enhance the stability of governance while winning over the hearts and mind of its nation’s population. When an insurgency arises in a host nation it does so mainly because of grievances within the population. Recommendations for confronting an insurgency included having small teams that primarily accompany, assist and advise, while indigenous military forces take the lead to bring stability to an area.