Abstract
Canada received its arctic north from Great Britain in 1880. It was not until 1973 that the Canadian government finally claimed sovereignty over the Northwest Passage as part of Canada's historic internal waters, but there was no legislation or treaty to support the statement. Claims were not formalized until 1986 with the implementation of straight baselines. Why the delay in claiming sovereignty or developing an arctic waters agenda? Even if one accepts the argument, as this author does, that the issue of sovereignty over the water, especially the Northwest Passage, did not arise until after World War Two, the question remains. The answer is rooted in three dilemmas that have faced Canada throughout its history: first, defining arctic sovereignty, especially distinguishing between sovereignty over the land and sovereignty over the water; second, allocating limited manpower and financial resources to back up sovereignty claims with concrete programs, projects, equipment, and personnel; and, third, living next to a neighbor with the world's largest economy and with ten times Canada's population, who is eager to operate in the North. Arguably, the first issue has been resolved, but the other two continue to plague Canada. At this time, Canadian claims to sovereignty over the Passage are not backed by an ability to defend, exploit, escort ships, or patrol the Passage year round. The Joint Arctic Weather Stations (JAWS) negotiations in 1946 were a turning-point in northern affairs. The emphasis on sovereignty began to shift from sovereignty over the Arctic land to sovereignty over the water.(f.21) The Canadian presence in the arctic waters up to this point had been by the Eastern Arctic Patrol. The role of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) in the Arctic was not defined prior to the end of World War Two. The RCN had grown exponentially during the war, and it emerged as the world's third naval power,(f.22) with expertise in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and convoy escort. The Navy sought to maintain an active profile and Canada moved to assert a northern presence because the Soviet Union was increasingly seen as a threat, and the United States was seeking a renewed foothold in the North. But the role of the peacetime Navy focused on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, not the Arctic.(f.23) The Canadians wanted to exert as much control as possible over the resupply operation of JAWS, but they were limited by the lack of resources. Most notably, the Canadians had neither an icebreaker capable of High Arctic operations nor sufficient personnel to perform the annual missions unilaterally. Thus, the operations were initially carried out by the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force, with Canadian observers aboard. The Canadian military has little to show in terms of equipment commitments to the Arctic. The proposals to purchase nuclear-powered submarines and new long-range Aurora aircraft failed to survive the government's budget cuts of 1989.(f.69) The Polar-8 icebreaker was canceled in 1990,(f.70) leaving Canada with no icebreaker capable of year-round High Arctic transit. The proposed fixed underwater surveillance system, which would have placed acoustic sensors "at three choke points at the entrances to the Northwest Passage," died in 1996,(f.71) leaving underwater transit of the Northwest Passage nearly impossible to detect. The coastal patrol Tracker aircraft will not be replaced, and the three new Arcturus patrol aircraft are woefully inadequate,(f.72) although they are slated to be upgraded, along with the existing long-range Aurora aircraft. Replacement of the Sea King helicopters is still in limbo. The decision to acquire four used Upholder class diesel-electric submarines from Great Britain has finally been made. Requested in 1994 but facing an uncertain future, the submarines were not even mentioned in the Procurement section of the 1996 Defence Planning Document.(f.73) But pressure for replacements of the three aged Oberon class diesel-electric submarines continued and the government announced the deal in April 1998.(f.74) While the majority of the submarines will operate in the Atlantic, one has been earmarked for the Pacific. However, no mention was made of Arctic deployment. In fact, the British subs do not have the ability to operate under the ice cap at this time. They must be modified in order to operate in the High Arctic,(f.75) but no mention of such modifications has been made.(f.76) Consequently, the Canadians still have no naval presence in the High Arctic and no way to detect foreign submarines in the waters it claims.