Abstract
This Article searches for the mythical textualist monster, hoping to expose it for the fraud it is. To do so, however, we need to get past current ways of thinking about constitutional method. Typically, explorations of textualism, or any other interpretive method (like original intent), take one of two approaches. First, some authors discuss textualism "in theory" or "in the abstract," seeking the objective foundation or essence of that method. Once found, that foundation or essence both defines textualism and justifies its use. Second, some authors critique how other authors use textualism. These critiques claim either that someone used textualism incorrectly, or that textualism should not have been used at all. Both approaches share the same perspective: an interpretive method is an object that we can examine and compare to a rational, ideal form. Just as one might assess a diamond based on the four "c's" of clarity, cut, carat, and color, one can assess textualism, or the use of textualism, based on its textbook definition.
There is only one way to take a constitutional method out for a test drive: use it to analyze a constitutional question. This Article takes that approach. Instead of discussing textualism in theory or critiquing a judge's use of textualism, I propose a constitutional case study that allows me, and the reader, to put textualism to use. Then, as I am making constitutional arguments and engaging in the practice of constitutional interpretation, I hope, through a sideways glance, to learn something about how the constitutional methods work. Riding along on this case study, I hope the reader might get a glimpse of what I see from the driver's seat: there is no such thing as textualism.